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An increasingly blurred understanding of the moral significance of narrative identity for a robust perception 
of self, other, and community suggests a critical need to explore the inter-relationships shared between 
autobiographical memory, emotional rationality, and narrative identity, particularly as it bears on decision 
making. This essay argues that (i) the disintegration of autobiographical memory degenerates emotional 
rationality; (ii) the degeneration of emotional rationality decays narrative identity; and (iii) the decay of 
narrative identity disables one to seek, identify, and act on the good. After demonstrating that narrative 
identity is best understood as the product of autobiographical memory and emotional rationality, which in 
turn is indispensable to substantive ethical decision making, the essay concludes by suggesting that narrative 
identity may be successfully employed as a justificatory framework for ethical decision making, providing both 
education to, and rigor for, substantive moral judgments.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
It is a marked feature of being human to make meaning out of experiences and 
events by telling stories. Individuals are born into a web of narratives, and to become 
a self is, in large part, to locate, verify, and make sense of the stories of which one’s 
web is comprised. Stories most adequately reveal the meaning individuals attach to their 
experiences, and they shape the meaning those experiences will have as the stories are 
told, retold, and refined (Mitchell 2014). In this way, narratives do many different kinds 
of moral work (Lindemann 2014). In addition to recounting phenomena from distinct 
perspectives, morally charged stories usually hold deep truths not easily expressed and 
apprehended in other ways. Such truths may include inchoate ideals of self, hidden 
hopes, deeper tensions, strands of ambivalence, belief in things unseen, and fears rarely 
stated plainly. These parcels of an individual’s narrative identity are, of course, of critical 
moral significance, but they are rarely captured by standard ethical analyses. Inasmuch as 
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stories reveal values and reasons otherwise unnoticed in the context of moral reflection, 
narrative identity is invaluable to ethical decision making. Indeed, one’s narrative identity 
not only provides substance for thoughtful deliberation about the right and the good, 
but also a way of conveying moral choices for subsequent evaluation and instruction 
(Mitchell 2014). 
Prior to the late 1980s, the significance of narrative identity was dismissed in the 
medical literature as unimportant and uninteresting (Brody and Clark 2014). By 1987, 
clinicians and scholars became interested in how the study of narrative could enhance 
their understanding of health care, and the field of “narrative medicine” was developed. 
After a flurry of activity at the turn of the twenty-first century, interest in the practical 
significance of narrative identity seemed to stall. The general interest in narrative 
medicine continued, but with few ideas about how narrative might be employed toward 
moral ends. In the last decade, however, forward momentum has returned (Ibid.), but 
the ontology of narrative identity and its vital role in ethical decision making remains 
incomplete. For some, the concept of (idiosyncratic) narrative decision making is founded 
upon inevitably imperfect, even fabricated, recollections of reality (Lindemann 2014), and 
therefore lacks the objective rigor necessary for practical decision making (Arras 1997). 
For others, the (irresponsible) flight from narrative decision making forces individuals to 
deliberate as “unencumbered selves,” apart from and devoid of the elements that ground 
moral values and commitments (Sandel 2006). 
A third approach, yet to be explored in the literature, grounds the framework of the 
arguments posited in this essay. It concerns the individual and collective relationships 
shared between autobiographical memory, emotional rationality, and narrative identity 
in the context of ethical decision making. The interconnectedness of these concepts 
is essential to any productive discussion over the ethics of decision making, yet each 
respective interconnection remains underdeveloped.
1.2 Analytical Method
An increasingly blurred understanding of the moral significance of narrative identity 
for a robust perception of self, other, and community suggests a critical need to explore 
the inter-relationships shared between autobiographical memory, emotional rationality, 
and narrative identity vis-à-vis ethical decision making. To that end, the essay argues that 
(i) the disintegration of autobiographical memory degenerates emotional rationality; (ii) 
the degeneration of emotional rationality decays narrative identity; and (iii) the decay of 
narrative identity disables one to seek, identify, and act on the good. After demonstrating 
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that narrative identity is best understood as the product of autobiographical memory 
and emotional rationality, which in turn is indispensable to substantive ethical decision 
making, the essay concludes by suggesting that narrative identity may be successfully 
employed as a justificatory framework for ethical decision making, providing both 
education to, and rigor for, substantive moral judgments.
To secure the justification of these theses, the essay moves in six parts. First, it 
addresses the historical emergence in neuroscience of crucial categories for ethical 
decision making, including a specific analysis of (i) autobiographical memory judgments, 
(ii) emotional choice and rational choice, and (iii) narrative identity as moral self-
conception and commitment. Second, it addresses the category of autobiographical 
memory and ethical decision making, including a specific analysis of (i) autobiographical 
memory and rationality, (ii) autobiographical memory and the narrative of human 
emotion, and (iii) autobiographical memory and the emotional nature of rational ethical 
decision making. Third, it addresses the category of emotional rationality and ethical 
decision making, including a specific analysis of (i) emotion and rationality, (ii) emotional 
rationality and morality, and (iii) emotional rationality and ethical decision making. 
Fourth, it addresses the category of narrative identity and ethical decision making, 
including a specific analysis of (i) narrative identity as the product of autobiographical 
memory and emotional rationality, (ii) the requisite unpredictability of narrative identity, 
and (iii) narrative neglect as threat to identity, authenticity, and ethical decision making. 
Finally, it addresses the justification of narrative identity as a comprehensive framework 
for ethical decision making, including a specific analysis of (i) narrative identity as moral 
education, moral methodology, and moral discourse, (ii) narrative identity as ground and 
object of normative ethical principles, and (iii) rigor in narrative judgments and ethical 
justification.
2. The Historical Emergence in Neuroscience  
of Crucial Categories for Ethical Decision Making
2.1 Autobiographical Memory Judgments
The study of memory and cognitive learning arose from philosophical questions 
concerning the way individuals come to know themselves, others, things, and the 
world around them. Learning is assuredly the primary method by which one acquires 
knowledge, and remembering is the primary means by which one supports knowledge 
claims. (This is exemplified, for instance, when a court witness claims to “remember 
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seeing Jones at the murder scene.”) While the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries were 
marked by empiricist philosophers such as John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Brown, 
and others who speculated about the numerous factors that might affect the degree or 
strength of particular subjective associations, it was philosophers writing in the twentieth 
century including Henri Bergson, Bertrand Russell, Endel Tulving, and others who first 
introduced to psychologists the distinction between episodic and semantic memory. 
However, it was not until the “everyday movement” of the final two decades of the 
twentieth century when researchers first argued that attention should focus primarily on 
the ways in which individuals use autobiographical memory in their daily tasks (Bower 
2000). 
There are two primary ways to query human memory. In recall tasks, one must 
generate a representation of a past stimulus, such as a word from memory. In memory-
judgment tasks, a synthetic representation of the stimulus is presented by a facilitator, 
and the subject answers a specific question about it from memory. Characterized this 
way, the number of possible memory-judgment tasks is essentially limitless. Some 
judgment tasks are related to specific experiences in one’s past. These include recognition 
judgments; judgments of membership in experimentally learned categories; judgments 
of presentation frequency; judgments of list membership; judgments of temporal order 
or recency; judgments of special order or location; and judgments of source, such as input 
modality monitoring (Hintzman 2000). Although individuals clearly possess conceptual 
knowledge relating to significant portions of their past, memories of disparate events 
are also “cross-indexed” in memory according to life themes, what happened, where it 
happened, who was involved, and what significance the event had in one’s life. Some 
of the knowledge manifests through personal episodic memory, which is experienced in 
recall with imagery and emotion. In addition to these episodic memories, large portions 
of one’s autobiography are in narrative form. As such, autobiographical memory is 
intimately bound up with conceptions of the self – of who and what one is. While several 
studies suggest that memories are often reconsolidated in light of self-serving pursuits, 
and that individuals often remember their actions, and therefore themselves, in a light 
more favorable than is deserved, these tendencies suggest that social, motivational, 
and personality-related factors play a vital role in the way autobiographical memory 
judgments are developed – and altered – over time (Bower 2000). 
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2.2 Emotional Choice and Rational Choice
The relationship between emotion and reason has been a major topic in Western 
philosophy since its genesis. The ancient Greeks had no word equivalent to “emotion,” 
and the term commonly used in its place, pathos, indicated something that “happened” 
to a person or thing. It came to be commonly applied to affective experiences to which 
a person is subject, and also lasting states manifested by such affection, or initiated or 
altered by them. Hence it became the term traditionally applied to emotions, fleeting or 
dispositional, if also to many other cognitive states (Price 2010). However, the relationship 
between emotional choice and rational choice is a more recent concern (Elster 2010).1 
Both reason and rationality are primarily normative inasmuch as they inform agents of 
the options that ideally should be pursued in the effort to secure sought-after ends. Their 
explanatory use arises when the agent takes the normative suggestion and tests it by 
confronting the prescribed behavior with its observed counterpart. In economics, for 
instance, rational-choice explanations, based on the assumption that agents will maximize 
utility, was the standard understanding of behavior until 1980, when it became subject 
to criticism from a number of scholars who subsequently developed new models of 
behavior. Broadly speaking, these alternative, neurocognitively-geared models constitute 
what has loosely become known as the field of behavioral economics (Ibid.). 
Emotions, too, have a role in behavioral economics, but a secondary one. The 
important work of George Loewenstein on “visceral factors” mentions the emotions, but 
only those pertaining to pain, thirst, intoxication, and addictive cravings, thus ignoring 
the neurocognitive precursor of emotions as well as the actions they have historically 
tended to (Ibid.). Typically, “emotions” have indicated “affect” or “arousal,” thus precluding 
critical distinctions such as that between guilt and shame. However, a systematic account 
of emotional impact on cognitive precursors of action can improve the understanding 
of manifold forms of behavior. Insofar as (i) emotions typically cannot be chosen and 
(ii) rationality can only be the product of choice, emotions cannot, in the strictest 
sense, be considered “rational.” Yet they are, by this fact, no less instrumentally useful 
and biologically adaptive. Indeed, emotions, differing only from rationality in the causal 
relation that obtains among them, undoubtedly enhance rationality indispensable for 
robust ethical decision making (Ibid.). 
1. This essay will not endeavor to explore the distinction between reason and rationality except to clarify that 
while the idea of reason is normative in purpose, rationality primarily serves to explain behavior. 
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2.3 Narrative Identity as Moral Self-Conception and Commitment
The formal concept of narrative identity was first postulated in the twentieth 
century: Sigmund Freud wrote about dream narratives, Carl Jung explored universal 
life myths, Alfred Adler examined narrative accounts of earliest memory, and Henry 
Murray identified recurrent autobiographical themes in the Thematic Apperception Test 
(McAdams 2008). Still, none of the traditional theories of personality in the first half of 
the twentieth century imagined human being as storytellers and human experience as a 
story to be told. The inaugural theories of narrative personality were developed in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. Silvan Tompkins proposed a “script theory” of personality that 
conceived of the individual as a metaphorical playwright who organizes the emotional 
experiences of life in terms of salient “scenes” and recurrent “scripts” (Ibid.). In a 
somewhat similar line of thought, Dan McAdams (2008) formulated a “life-story” model 
of identity, suggesting that people living in modern society begin, in late adolescence 
and young adulthood, to understand their lives as ever-evolving stories that integrate 
the reconstructed past and the projected future in order to imbue life with degrees of 
unity and purpose. As such, these defining memories become vital components of one’s 
narrative identity – an identity from which one is able to understand self, others, and 
community, and so make moral decisions in accord with the values to which one has 
committed.
In recent years, theories of narrative identity have tried to navigate a middle road 
between personal and social commitments, viewing narrative identity as both an 
autobiographical project and a situated performance (McAdams 2008). Neuroscientists 
such as Antonio Damasio (2007) have commented that consciousness begins when an 
individual brain secures the power of telling a story. Those stories and their storytellers 
appear in every culture (McAdams 2008). As Paul Ricoeur (1984) comments, stories 
are the best means known to human beings for communicating how and why a human 
agent, endowed with consciousness and motivated by intention, enacts desires and 
strives toward goals over time. Thus understood, narrative is the neurobiological linchpin 
that draws, holds, and frames together temporal events in a coherent whole. Whether 
factual or fictional, the narrative structure of one’s conception of self is pivotal to securing 
meaning and identity in life (Polkinghorne 1991). Moreover, the unfolding of one’s self-
told story has immediate cognitive implications for the capacity to make coherent ethical 
decisions. As William James notes, the (conscious) self encompasses a “storytelling ‘I’” 
whose stories about lived experience become part and parcel of a “storied ‘me.’” In this 
way, the narrative decision-maker is both the storyteller and the stories that are told 
(McAdams 2008).
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3. The Category of Autobiographical Memory and Ethical Decision Making
3.1 Autobiographical Memory and Rationality
The rational function of autobiographical memory is derived from its distributive 
property throughout manifold cortical systems. Each cortical system – from those 
controlling data acquisition and analysis to semantic, episodic, and working memory – 
is defined by the functional contribution it makes to the whole (Nyberg and Cabeza 
2000). While the understanding of cortical organization endures constant revision, two 
general observations can be gleaned from contemporary neuroimaging techniques. The 
first is that prefrontal brain regions are the most acutely involved in examined memory 
domains, including those immediately related to rational recollection. Some imaging has 
shown distinct engagement in regions within the prefrontal cortex for memory operation 
(Ibid.). These findings hint at the heterogeneity of the prefrontal cortex, and thus further 
exhibit the neurological complexity of rationality. The second involves the interaction 
between prefrontal and posterior brain regions during the encoding and retrieval of 
individual memories. This indicates that the posterior regions, which store and maintain 
information, are refreshed by frontal regions, which consequently mediate rehearsal 
processes of working memory indispensable to rational cognition (Ibid.). 
A cardinal element of the rational function of autobiographical memory is 
neurocognitive encoding and retrieval processes. Several factors are necessary to 
productive encoding, including motivation, strategic planning, and past knowledge. 
Complex networks of neurons “encode” memories of personally-experienced events, 
accrued knowledge, and acquired skills. These networks are responsible for the rational 
recollection of various life experiences. Once activated, these particular neural networks, 
which represent specific life experiences in coded form, permit individuals to recall and 
reexperience specific events or facts from personal history. On the cognitive level, such 
activation allows access to memory networks related to time, circumstance, location, 
and function pertaining to the object or event in consideration. Hence, proportionate 
memory encoding is causally related to rationality. Equally important is the operation 
by which memory is retrieved. “Forgetting” is a morally relevant concept to rational 
memory, and most forgotten things can be partially attributed to failures in retrieval 
processes. This notion leads to what is known as the principle of encoding specificity, 
which holds that retrieval cues are effective to the extent that information related to 
the cue was incorporated in the trace of the original encoding (Brown and Craik 2000). 
It follows, then, that rationality hinges on the dependent similarities of encoding and 
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retrieval operations. Indeed, it is precisely this overlap that determines the degree to 
which memory is able to function well (Ibid.). 
Other critical constituents of the rationality of memory are the concepts of 
remembering and knowing. Remembering and knowing are two rational states of 
awareness pertaining to autobiographical memory. The concept of remembering refers 
to the personal experience, often intimate, of past events that recreates the awareness 
inherent to a thorough perception and understanding of self. The concept of knowing 
refers to separate experiences of past events, most notably those in which one is more 
impersonally aware of possessing particular general, familiar, and abstract knowledge. 
Unlike remembering, knowing allows individuals to be aware of events without reliving 
them cognitively. Remembering and knowing are thus basal to rationality. The proposal 
that remembering and knowing are two expressive manifestations of autonoetic and 
noetic consciousness suggests their dominant relation to neurological encoding and 
subsequent role in the apprehension of values (Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn 2000), 
the driving work of which is performed by the emotions.
3.2 Autobiographical Memory and the Narrative of Human Emotion
The interconnected structures within the limbic system possess a pivotal emotional 
mechanism immediately related to autobiographical memory. These structures – which 
include hippocampal formation, fornix, mammillary bodies, the mammillothalamic tract, 
cingulate gyrus, and cingulum – confirm the existence of a uniform system, known as the 
“Papez circuit,” whereby information is temporarily circulated and ultimately associated 
and synchronized with emotional and motivational subjective states prior to being 
transmitted into long-term storage areas (Markowitsch 2000). Other limbic systems, 
such as the amygdalar and septal nuclei, have become regarded as still more intimately 
associated with emotional regulation. Nevertheless, both sets of mechanistic systems 
temper and tone the emotional consolidation of autobiographical memory through 
operations of information evaluation. These sets belong to the basolateral limbic circuit, 
which includes the mediodorsal nucleus. Hence, disorders of memory systems that 
control emotions render individuals incapable of rationalizing and evaluating information, 
the consequence of which is significantly reduced memory capacity. This much denotes 
the important nature of proper emotional embedding within neurocognitive memory 
circuits (Markowitsch 2000). 
Most individuals can, upon request, account for a significant portion of their lives 
thus far. These accounts are grounded in what these individuals have been told as well 
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as what they personally recollect from past experience. Such autobiographical memory 
includes manifold forms of self-related information of idiosyncratic importance. The 
emotional significance of momentous events, turning points, and nuclear episodes are, 
in fact, cognitive recollections of the most expressive scenes that comprise an individual 
life story. Emotions tied to influential life events are central to one’s experience of self, 
others, and community. Indeed, memories that flow forth from emotion explain much 
of who one is and the values one most deeply holds to. Yet life stories are not merely the 
sequence of isolated events. Rather, emotional memories comprise larger narratives that 
attribute meaning to events by identifying them as part of the “master portrait” of one’s 
life (Neisser and Libby 2000). This is presumably what draws Alasdair MacIntyre (2007) 
to conclude that the first step in seeking the good is to identify the story or stories that 
comprise one’s history. 
Since memory is greatly affected by emotions tied to autobiographical events, 
a clearer look at the breath of and depth to which emotions affect memory may be 
advantageous. The exploration of negative emotions, such as sadness, shock, or terror, 
has typically been spliced into three neurocognitive conceptions of recollection: (i) 
eyewitness memory, (ii) flashbulb memory, and (iii) memory for traumatic experiences 
(Schooler and Eich 2000). While each conception possesses its own set of paradigmatic 
blueprints, all three harmonize on the issue of whether emotions enhance or extinguish 
the strength of a particular memory of an event. While the impact of emotion on 
memory involves complex interactions among multiple variables, current neurocognitive 
data suggests that emotions do, for better or worse,2 generally enhance the strength of 
particular memories (Schooler and Eich 2000).
3.3 Autobiographical Memory and the Emotional Nature  
of Rational Ethical Decision Making
Sound ethical decisions flow forth from both emotional and rational recollections 
of events in history. As mentioned above, two fundamental methods mark the query 
of human memory. The first, concerning tasks related to recall, stimulates associations 
related to regenerations of past memorable events. The second, concerning tasks related 
to autobiographical memory judgment, stimulates carbon-copy recollections of past 
events by way of third-party participation (Hintzman 2000), the product of which 
renders subjects able to answer pointed questions pertaining to a particular memory. 
2. Broadly speaking, this suggests only the fact of enhancement, not necessarily the accuracy thereof. 
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These questions may apply to efforts to grade and categorize events, or to broader 
efforts to compare events in autobiographical history by dissecting relevant dimensions. 
Because both methods implicate the frontal lobes and are bound by the hippocampus, 
it follows that the cognitive work of autobiographical memory-judgment in the rational 
apprehension of emotive values is critical to substantive ethical decision making (Ibid.). 
Moreover, memory retrieval networks possess problem-solving capacities valuable 
to rational ethical decision making. Even a fleeting examination of everyday episodic 
memory suggests that there is much more to remembering than plucking data from 
neurocognitive storage units. Related to decision making, some reports suggest that, in 
actual life situations, memory retrieval techniques involve complex exchanges between 
two distinct processing types: (i) a controlled, systematic process that guides retrieval, 
coordinating operations related to transient memory targets (its rational nature), and 
(ii) the automatic, involuntary inception and association of ideas into consciousness over 
the course of the exploration (its emotional nature). This interplay between deductive 
(rational) and inductive (narrative and emotional) processes hints at the associations 
and activations inherent to the effort to translate concrete memories into applications 
to decision making. Put simply, the task is to match deductive to inductive processes. 
Insofar as the memory of past events can serve to guide an instance of particular moral 
judgment, the subject is able to both identify the goal and the best method by which to 
realize it. The rational (deductive) and narrative and emotional (inductive) components 
of memory retrieval, then, specifically coordinate, store, and orchestrate the process of 
ethical decision making (Koriat 2000). 
A final aptitude of memory – namely, episodic memory and autonoetic awareness 
– is worthy of mention insofar as it pertains both intimately and imminently to rational 
ethical decision making. Episodic memory is the neurocognitive system whereby one is 
able to experience the world autonoetically – that is, through the situation of oneself in 
the past through recollection. This achievement of the human mind is perhaps its most 
remarkable, and certainly its most important in relation to decision making. It is also the 
singular dimension that distinguishes it from all other systems of memory (Wheeler, 
2000). Episodic and autonoetic remembering enables individuals to mentally retrace 
their steps, as it were, gathering together pertinent emotional experiences upon which 
rational knowledge is based. Thus, these systems share a close relationship with mental 
achievements such as introspection and anticipation, and, as such, serve well the ability 
to make robust ethical decisions (Ibid.).
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4. The Category of Emotional Rationality and Ethical Decision Making
4.1 Emotion and Rationality
Neurocognitive studies within the last several years suggest that a common moral-
psychological problem in contemporary society lies not in knowing, but in feeling, what 
is moral (Raine and Yang 2006). This feeling, frequently referred to as “moral emotion” 
(Prinz 2010), located in the prefrontal cortex and amygdala, is the springboard from 
which cognitive recognition that a particular act is immoral is translated into specific 
behavioral inhibition (Raine and Yang 2006). The complexity of emotion has rendered it 
neuroethically problematic for several reasons, many of which continue to serve as the 
impetus for its rejection in the realm of rationality. Hence, emotion is widely conceived as 
relatively useless – or at least not particularly constructive – to ethical decision making. 
Emotion has been critically described as overly perceptive, personal, unstable, intense, 
partial, and fleeting. Interestingly, the perceptivity and personal nature of emotion 
has been used to critique it on grounds that it is, ipso facto, overly subjective. Yet it 
seems quite contrarily the case that perceptivity and reasonable idiosyncrasy would 
hinder something more than prove a redeeming virtue – here, integral authenticity. 
What remains scantily investigated, then, is the more positive – and often overlooked 
– objectively-beneficial features of emotion – namely, its cognitive complementarity, 
evaluative faculties, motivating power, strength, and tendency to capture critical, 
otherwise inexplicit elements of reality (Ben-Ze’ev 2010). These uncharted features hint 
at the idea that emotion may inherently possess a particular, if peculiar, rationality that, 
in turn, renders it practically useful. 
Emotional, or “axiological” (de Sousa 1987), rationality refers to the affective 
cognition of particular objects in time and space that activate instinctive routines 
and motivate specific courses of action (Morton 2010). To “emote” something is to 
apprehend it – that is, to positively or negatively value, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the object considered. de Sousa helpfully synthesizes emotion as “determinate patterns 
of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies” (de 
Sousa 1980, 137). The rationality derived from emotional intelligence allows insight, for 
example, into differentiations between good and bad, right and wrong, harmful and 
helpful, proportionate and disproportionate, and so forth. Whereas strictly intellectual 
rationality invites examination into the “whatness” of objects, and strictly deductive 
reasoning invites examination into the solution to logical problems, emotional rationality 
invites examination into the values of actions, circumstances, relationships, and the like 
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(Vacek 2001; Lonergan 1972). One need only consider the plagued history of human 
experimentation to grasp the indispensable rationality inherent to human emotion. As 
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (2013) note, it was not the strictly rational scientists 
who first protested abusive research practices, but rather those who were able to feel 
compassion, disgust, and outrage.
On this basis, it is reasonable to conclude that emotions possess an epistemic quality 
in relation to rationality. Properly tempered by objective rationality, emotions serve as 
tools that perceive essential moral data and alert individuals to the presence of significant 
moral events (Morton 2010). Human beings are often conscious of this experience as 
an instance of “feeling,” but this neurological process also comprehensively synthesizes 
causal material essential to thought and action (Ibid.). Hence, only when emotional 
valuation resonates with objective rationality – herein understood as the successful ability 
to manipulate concepts productively – can one’s best thinking confidently conclude what 
should be done in a given instance (Solomon 1980). Central convictions grounded in 
emotional rationality are therefore strong blends of reasoning, argument, evidence, 
and valuation bound together in a coherent and comprehensive neurocognitive system. 
Emotional rationality is thus the preponderance of specific and general objective evidence 
linked with phenomenological data and accepted from a common normative source. Only 
after examining, analyzing, and edifying an original emotive response to a given object is 
it clear that objective rationality has achieved its full potential in the context of morality 
(Callahan 1991).
4.2 Emotional Rationality and Morality
Emotions play many roles in human life, and none more important than forming 
the enduring individual and social bonds necessary to secure adequate moral judgment. 
Although the philosophical critique of emotional rationality is often mistakenly attributed 
to Immanuel Kant (1996), his claim that consciousness of one’s obligations depends on 
the capacity to feel them projects the immediate significance of emotions in the moral 
arena. Here, two points deserve notation. The first is that emotions play a major part 
in motivating moral behavior. Persons are motivated to provide assistance to others by 
virtue of their affection, affinity, or compassion.3 Emotions also motivate individuals to 
pursue justified punishment or revenge, both of which are moralistic behaviors. As Prinz 
3. A common contextual critique is that emotions are egotistic and not genuinely altruistic; therefore, they 
cannot be considered “rational.” The point here is not to prove or disprove this claim, but to contend that, 
in either case, emotions are important. 
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clarifies further, the motivation to punish poor behavior, as an essential element of global 
systems of criminal justice, is often retributive in nature, and, as such, emotional. Second, 
emotions are, as suggested above, critical to moral epistemology. Moral evaluation is 
frequently associated with perception, and this capacity is considered to possess an 
emotional foundation. In other words, something is considered prima facie good or 
bad, right or wrong in light of the emotional response it elicits. Properly tempered by 
objective rationality, emotions serve as tools that perceive essential moral data and alert 
individuals to the presence of significant moral events (Prinz 2010). 
Much like beliefs, emotions are “directed” toward particular objects – that is, they 
possess a particular intentionality (Mulligan 2010). This process of sensory decoding is 
an activation of basic emotional responses by anteromedial temporal, brain stem, and 
basal forebrain structures, the attribution of moral-emotional significance by orbital 
and prefrontal structures, and the subsequent command and restriction of actions by 
the frontal lobes (Moll, Oliveira-Souza, and Eslinger 2003). Insofar as emotions have 
correctness conditions regulated by the frontal lobes, they may be said to possess 
constructs of potentially proportionate valuation. It is therefore possible to maintain 
that neurocognitive emotional regulation allows individuals to be aware of values critical 
to moral analysis (Tappolet 2000). In this respect, reasons to emote behave similarly 
to reasons to desire, act, and believe. In its barest form, emotions neither present nor 
represent a distinctive value. Rather, they are embodied reactions to particular “grasped” 
values. The formal object of moral emotion, then, is the material object of whatever 
neurocognitive state offers or signifies that which an individual most affectively responds 
to (Mulligan 2010).
Both unintentionally and unknowingly, the finest neuro-philosophical account of 
emotional-moral motivation may belong to John Rawls (1998), who sharply demonstrates 
how emotions underlie an adequate sense and practice of justice. In essence, Rawls 
interprets guilt as developing into multiple stages of (eventually) widespread moral 
emotion through the promotion of increasingly cultivated cognition within conditions 
of love and trust that subsequently aim to increase self-esteem. Rawls’s account of the 
development of moral emotions, and thus an appropriate sense of justice, begins from 
a general assumption of rational, and therefore proportionate, intuitions. Beyond its 
exhortation to take seriously the principles of justice with which societies must requisitely 
comply in order to live well, it presupposes communities comprised of supportive 
families, peers, and other cooperative social groups who first agree to abide by these 
operative concepts of equality and goodness (Greenspan 2010). Because the breach of 
normative principles is inevitable even in well-ordered societies, Rawls introduces guilt 
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as the emotion that ideally serves as the guiding force to rehabilitate behavior to its 
intended moral state. The role of emotion in securing morality is, then, for Rawls, visibly 
justificatory, and it provides essential support to the operative principles of normative 
morality. Hence, Rawls’ theory of justice provides necessary insight into the emotional 
framework of normative morality with the assignment of objective status to affective 
intuitions, which consequently hints at their evaluative capacities (Ibid.).
4.3 Emotional Rationality and Ethical Decision Making
Because the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VPMC) is essential for decision making, 
and because both cognitive and emotional systems are active within the VPMC, is 
follows that decision making is emotionally rational by nature (Glannon 2011). Indeed, 
this is what leads Damasio (2007) to conclude that patients who suffer damage to 
and dysfunction in the VPMC are rendered impaired in both cognitive and emotional 
processes. Hence, emotional impairments are intimately linked with irrational moral 
choices. Given the scientific evidence that the thalamic-amygdala – a primitively hard-
wired neurological system – may potentially function independently of cognition, 
philosophical arguments such as that posited by David Hume (1978) become more 
understandable. For Hume, reason is but the slave of emotion; hence, moral decision 
making is driven primarily by affection (Glannon 2011). Against this idea, Peter Singer 
(2005) concludes that the only way to avoid moral skepticism in decision making is to 
detach moral judgments that are owed to cultural history from those that possess a 
rational basis.
A metaphorical concept helpful in understanding emotional and cognitive systems 
critical for moral decision making within the VPMC is tutorship. Here, three theses merit 
brief mention in order to exemplify the decision making process: (i) reason judges and 
tutors emotion; (ii) emotion tests and tutors reason; and (iii) emotion tutors emotion. 
Regarding the first, prompting, educating, and regulating emotions is possible – and 
necessary – through rational tutoring. This is accessible through the neurocognitive 
exercise of imagining particular images and beliefs that shape feeling. So doing helps 
rationally control the strictly emotional process that may displace decision making. 
Regarding the second, emotions of empathy and sympathy are innate in human nature 
(Preston and de Waal 2002), and these affective responses fuel efforts to reconsider 
previously held, strictly rational judgments. Righteous anger, for example, motivates 
individuals to work steadfastly for social justice and necessary change. When Saint 
Augustine (2008) exhorted his congregation to love and do as they wished, he realized 
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that emotions focus, expand, and transform rational moral commitments (Callahan 
1991).
Finally, regarding the third, it is a psychological fact, important to philosophy, that 
individuals are able to receive moral assistance from focusing attention on things that are 
valuable: people of heroic virtue, breathtaking art, perhaps the metaphysics of beauty 
itself. Human beings are naturally attached to particular persons, things, or concepts, and 
when an attachment grows sour it is swiftly replaced by another, redeeming emotional 
attachment. When emotions are tutored by other, positive emotions – say, for instance, 
love and a proportionate sense of justice – an individual is less subject to deformation of 
moral judgment, and more inclined to choose rationally. Errors in ethical decision making 
arise when a regressed and selfish will endures stress or conflict. Conversely, when one 
cares about moral truth and is committed to actualizing goodness, one is better prepared, 
through mature emotional rationality, to carefully attend to, clearly see, and fairly stand 
with moral commitments, and thus to act on them appropriately (Callahan 1991).
5. The Category of Narrative Identity and Ethical Decision Making
5.1 Narrative Identity as the Product of Autobiographical Memory  
and Emotional Rationality
For better or worse, the convergence of one’s autobiographical memory and 
emotional rationality produces one’s narrative identity – one’s conception of self. At 
core, the notion of the “narrative self” centers on the innate effort of human beings 
to understand and interpret the world through storytelling (Sellnow 2010). Building 
on Martin Heidegger’s (1949) claim that human beings are essentially “embodied 
conversations” and that the unity of conversation serves to support human existence, 
Walter Fisher (Technical Logic 1987) remarks that individuals experience and comprehend 
life as a series of narratives that possess various beginnings, middles, and ends. However, 
all conversations, and the narratives to which they contribute, are not equally valuable. 
That is, authentic narratives must be evaluated by applying the standards of “narrative 
rationality” – a term first employed by Fisher in 1984 – to them. Such rationality is the 
method by which narratives, autobiographical and emotional at core, are accorded their 
status as “true” (Sellnow 2010). 
According to Fisher (Technical Logic 1987), human communication is tested against 
principles of coherence (i.e., narrative probability) and fidelity (i.e., truthfulness and 
reliability). Regarding the former, coherence is the degree to which a story “hangs 
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together” – that is, how probable or believable the story seems, both to oneself and to 
others, and whether the characters act in a consistent manner. Thus, coherent narratives 
do not possess altered facts or neglect pertinent details and have considered possible 
alternative interpretations to ensure veracity (Sellnow 2010). Just as individuals often 
arrive at firm conclusions through comparing the coherence of their stories with stories 
of similar detail, so too the coherence of narrative is tested when the beginnings, middles, 
and ends of a life story resonate with others that have trod similar ground (Ibid.). Central 
to the notion of narrative coherence is character. In this context, character is understood 
as an organized set of “actional tendencies.” If such tendencies contradict one another, 
change significantly, or alter in ways that do not resonate with lived experience, character 
is called into question. Coherence, then, requires that characters behave in characteristic 
ways. Without such fundamental autobiographical and emotional predictability, there 
can be no trust, community, or rational order (Fisher, Technical Logic 1987).
Regarding the latter, fidelity is the degree to which values expressed in a story 
ring true with what one regards as truthful and fair. In this sense, narrative strikes a 
responsive, emotional cord. An autobiographical narrative possesses fidelity when it 
offers good reasons to accept its underlying moral, which will ultimately serve to guide 
one’s actions in the future. These “good reasons” spring from the values inherent to the 
message, the pertinence of those values to the decision being made, the consequences 
that will foreseeably result from complying with or ignoring those values, and the degree 
to which those values resonate with the worldview and values of both the individual 
who shares the narrative and others with whom its message is exchanged. Finally, Fisher 
(Human Communication 1987) contends that most human beings possess an inner desire 
to uphold truth, beauty, goodness, wisdom, courage, justice, communion, friendship, and 
oneness with the cosmos. To this end, narrative fidelity exemplifies the degree to which 
the good reasons of one’s story resonate with the ideal values by which one ought to live 
(Sellnow 2010).
5.2 The Requisite Unpredictability of Narrative Identity
Autobiographical and emotional history is, according to MacIntyre (2007), an 
enacted narrative in which the characters also serve as co-authors. This notion suggests 
that human beings never start ab initio, but rather plunge in medias res, the beginnings 
of their stories already carved out by who and what has gone before. Just as literary 
characters, human beings neither begin nor go on exactly where or how they please. 
All individuals, then, predisposed to significant segments of the narratives into which 
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they come to be, are constrained by the actions of others and by the social settings 
presupposed in their actions. Understood this way, it becomes clear that the enacted 
narrative of one’s life is not, and cannot be, predictable. This sort of unpredictability is 
required for the narrative structure of human life, and the empirical data unearthed by 
social scientists provides an understanding of human life that is compatible with this 
structure (MacIntyre 2007).
The requisite unpredictability of narrative identity coexists with a second teleological 
characteristic of all narratives. This characteristic concerns the fact that individuals live out 
their lives, both individually and socially, in light of particular conceptions of a potentially 
shared future, a future in which certain possibilities (e.g., joy and pain, tragedy and 
triumph) call them forward while others repel them, some seemingly foreclosed and 
others inevitable. Thus understood, there is no present that is not informed by a particular 
image of a distinctive future. This imagined future always presents itself in the form of 
ends or goals toward which human beings are either progressing or failing to progress in 
the present. Hence, the unpredictability of both narrative and teleology coexist in life. 
Like characters in a fictional novel, individuals do not know what will happen next, but 
their lives will possess a certain form that projects itself toward the future. Thus, if one’s 
individual and social life is to continue intelligibly, it is always the case both that there are 
limits on how the story can continue and that within those limits there are innumerable 
ways in which it can continue (Ibid.).
Here, a central thesis begins to emerge. It concerns the notion that human beings 
are, in both their actions and their fictions, essentially story-telling creatures. That is, 
through one’s autobiographical and emotional history, one becomes a teller of stories 
that aspire to truth. This truth is rooted in a fundamental moral normativity by which the 
significance and meaning of life stories are made interpretable. It thus becomes clear that 
one can only identify what one is to do – that is, what the right, the good, or perhaps 
the least worse thing to do in a given instance is – if one first identifies the narrative or 
narratives of which one finds oneself a part. One enters human society, in other words, 
with one or more characters imputed – roles into which one has been drafted – and one 
must learn what they are in order to understand how others are to respond and how 
one’s responses to others are appropriately construed. Hence, there is no way to gain 
an understanding of society except through the compilation of stories that comprise 
its initial dramatic resources. To be the subject of an authentic narrative that runs from 
one’s birth to one’s death and possesses both autobiographical and emotional integrity 
is to be accountable for the actions and experiences that compose a “narratable” life 
(Ibid.). Put simply, it is to be open to give a particular account of what one did, what one 
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experienced, and what one witnessed at any earlier point in one’s life than the time at 
which the question is posed (Ibid.). 
5.3. Narrative Neglect as Threat to Identity, Authenticity,  
and Ethical Decision Making
Narrative theorists from John Locke (1997) to Charles Taylor (1991) underscore that 
in the creation of autobiographical structures upon which self-understanding hinges, one 
is able to participate in the process of selecting particular memories, based on important 
life incidents and themes, to be stored in neural networks, which consequently produce 
one’s sense of existence in the world (Escobedo and Adolphs 2010). This process marks 
the means by which individuals interpret, make sense of, and extract meaning from life 
events. Regaining and reforming a systematized and consistent narrative after a traumatic 
event remains, then, vital to the larger reconstruction of one’s autobiographical narrative 
of authenticity in the effort to make sense of trauma and identify meaning within it (Bell 
2008). In this way, autobiographical memory is equally critical to one’s ability persist 
through time, retain moral agency, and maintain moral responsibility (Glannon 2006). 
If who one is depends to a greater or lesser extent upon what one does, then what one 
does depends to a greater or lesser extent upon what one remembers – or, put more 
precisely, what one remembers in light of one’s narrative identity. The conclusion gleaned 
is that who one is depends to a greater or lesser extent upon what one remembers, and, 
more immediately, who one remembers oneself to be. Hence, to neglect one’s narrative 
is to sacrifice everything else.
As implied above, the rationality of emotion is largely a sociocultural concept, which 
implies the idea that rationality is, in large part, embedded in respective cultures. That 
being said, narrative authenticity must also be partly independent from the recognition 
of others, since the recognition of others has the potential to be incorrect for a number of 
reasons. Nevertheless, the emotionally-rational authenticity inherent to autobiographical 
memory cannot be appropriately assessed by individuals alone. This is due to the fact 
that, to some extent, each individual is embedded in a sociological culture greater than 
oneself, and hence is perpetually confronted by the positions of others that serve to 
evaluate one’s emotional life. Since emotion is considered authentic by virtue of its 
rationality,4 neglecting emotional memories irrevocably knit together with the coherence 
and consistence of an individual’s narrative identity will only serve to abruptly tilt an 
4. The same can be said reciprocally of rationality – that is, that every reason is considered authentic by virtue 
of its emotional nature. 
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individual life toward the inauthentic and the disintegrated. If neglected, new emotions 
would, at best, appear as doubtful, and so rather than effectively reinstating an individual 
state of being, they would de facto deconstruct it. For some contemporary philosophers 
of mind, authenticity is a perceptible state (Kraemer 2011). If this is persuasive, then an 
adequate ethics of maintaining authenticity leaves no room for narrative neglect (Taylor 
1991). 
Beyond threatening authentic autobiographical memory, emotional rationality, and 
narrative identity in less transparent ways, narrative neglect proves more sharply – and 
visibly – impedimentary to sound ethical decision making. Insofar as one’s life story is 
always embedded in the story of the communities from which one derives one’s identity, 
the attempt to cut oneself off from that past is to deform one’s present relationships. 
This is so because one is never able to seek, identify, and act on the good solely as an 
individual. Individuals inherit from the past of their families, cities, tribes, and nations a 
variety of debts, expectations, and moral obligations. These inheritances constitute the 
given of one’s life, one’s moral starting point. It is also how life gains its own moral 
particularity. Ultimately, then, one finds oneself part of a particular history and, regardless 
of whether one prefers or recognizes it, as the bearer of a narrative greater than one’s 
own (MacIntyre 2007).
6. The Justification of Narrative Identity as a Comprehensive Framework  
for Ethical Decision Making
6.1 Narrative Identity as Moral Education, Moral Methodology,  
and Moral Discourse
Even the most ardent devotee of analytical rigor can admit that most individuals, 
most of the time, learn much of what they know about morality from narratives of 
one kind or another (Murray 1997). To say that narrative identity contributes to ethical 
decision making through the providence of a particular form of moral education is 
hardly a controversial claim, but it is an important one nonetheless. Defenders of 
an ethics-as-propositions conception of decision making argue that individuals are 
simply too dense to grasp, remember, or learn, and that because of this society must 
fall back on narrative identity as a heuristic device. But narratives are not second-best 
instruments for representing the content of morality in a vivid, memorable way. Rather, 
they are themselves that content (Murray 1997). If the enterprise of moral education 
is understood as a pursuit of truth in all its forms, requiring a deep and sympathetic 
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investigation of all major ethical alternatives and the comparison of each with one’s 
active sense of narrative identity, then it requires narrative identity and the experience of 
attending to it for its own completion (Nussbaum 1990).
As mentioned above, a method of moral reasoning grounded in narrative identity has 
experienced a recent resurgence (Murray 1997). Blaise Pascal’s brutal yet brilliant assault 
on its abuses made casuistry a term of dishonor. Nevertheless, as ethicists struggled with 
actual cases, the case-centered approach inherent to casuistry was often employed on a 
variety of moral problems. In time, the restoration of a narrative-based casuistry as an 
intellectually respectable method of moral reasoning would gain credence. This trail was 
blazed by Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, whose method would gain credence by 
the late 1980s (Murray 1997). As Jonsen and Toulmin (1988) note, the heart of human 
experience does not lie in a mastery of rules and theoretical principles, however sound 
and well-reasoned they might appear. Instead, it is located in the practical wisdom that 
comes from seeing how the ideas behind rules work out in the course of one’s (evolving) 
narrative identity – in particular, seeing more precisely what is involved in accepting (or 
rejecting) this or that rule in one or another set of circumstances. Only an adequate 
recollection of the autobiographical and emotional elements of narrative identity can 
equip individual agents with the tools necessary to weigh moral considerations of various 
kinds and resolve conflicts between those considerations.
Moral philosophers rarely behave as geometricians, forwarding axioms, definitions, 
or theorems in their moral discourse (Murray 1997). Rather, they typically tell stories of 
at least two genres. The first is the “philosopher’s hypothetical,” which it meant to make 
a particular point, usually about the plausibility or implausibility of an assertion about 
ethics. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s (1971) violinist and Bernard Williams’s (1973) traveler are 
well known examples of the genre. These stories function either to reinforce confidence in 
the proposition being forwarded or to reveal its defect (Murray 1997).5 The second, less 
noted genre of narrative is intended to construct, motivate, and display the necessity of 
the theorist’s approach. This is the method, for instance, of MacIntyre (2007), by which 
he describes contemporary morality as a collection of incompatible shards of earlier 
moralities that were more coherent. The success of MacIntyre’s project is, in large part, 
due to its birth in and motivation by narrative identity – that is, by stories about who 
5. If it is not obviously wrong for a woman who wakes up and finds herself attached to a violinist to want to 
disconnect the tubes that are keeping him alive, then neither is it obviously wrong for a woman who finds 
herself pregnant to want to cease supporting the fetus growing inside of her body – or so Thomson’s story 
is meant to suggest.
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individuals are, what they are like, and how they came to be in their current situation. 
Most, if not all, moral discourse, including moral theory, is embedded in, conditioned by, 
and conducted through narratives (Murray 1997).
6.2 Narrative Identity as Ground and Object of Normative Ethical Principles
John Arras (1997) contends that narrative is an essential supplement to ethical 
principles. His argument is twofold : first, that narrative elements are inevitably 
embedded in all forms of moral reasoning; and second, that individual responses to 
narrative are the ground out of which principles and theories develop. For the former 
part of the argument, Arras relies heavily on the work of Rita Charon, who passionately 
calls for narrative competence in bioethics while maintaining the fundamental structure 
of principlism within the field. Arras thus interprets the significance of narrative identity 
as supplementary to principles, viewing narrative as the oil that lubricates the gears of 
normative principles, thereby enhancing their function. The latter part of his argument 
appeals to the model of reflective equilibrium, claiming that few principlists would 
ground their theories in a way that prohibited them from being tested against considered 
judgments about actual circumstances. On this view, most principlists are moral 
coherentists in the sense of relying on particular, considered judgments as a necessary 
means to test general theories. Arras points out that the cases that give rise to these 
considered judgments are themselves revelatory of some narrative identity: they contain 
either micro-narratives that describe what it means for a particular person to behave in 
a particular way, or macro-narratives that describe the history of a particular behavior 
and its particular social benefits or burdens (Arras 1997). For Arras and others, then, an 
ethics grounded in narrative identity is not a new approach, but rather a recognition and 
appreciation of the debt that principle-driven modes of discourse owe to stories (Brody 
2003).
However, a much stronger case can be made for the dependence of principles on 
narratives, grounded in the meaning individuals attribute to the historical development 
of principles (Ibid.). Against Jonsen and Toulmin (1988), Childress (1997) argues that 
individuals learn both norms and narratives from their parents, and that without norms, 
it is impossible to understand and classify the narratives. For Childress, it is a mistake 
to view the genesis of an individual’s moral development as grounded in stories, with 
the understanding of general norms constituting a later, more sophisticated stage of 
development. Yet it seems quite plausible that moral development occurs in precisely the 
opposite way. Consider, for example, how children learn to recognize the distribution of 
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goods as fair or unfair – an activity that becomes a metaphor for the principle of justice. 
A child watches his parents dividing goods in a particular way and witnesses the result 
this behavior has on his three other siblings. On another occasion the child watches his 
younger sister steal all the goods for herself and similarly witnesses the effect it has on 
all parties. Finally, the child is given the responsibility to divide and distribute the goods 
among his siblings and, perhaps with prompting, decides to emulate his parents and not 
his younger sister. (This can be understood as a new, and perhaps first, instance in which 
the child invokes moral judgment.) The situation reminds the child of the narratives in 
which he previously participated and provides criteria to determine whether the new 
narrative produces a fair distribution (Brody 2003).
Apart from the exercise of principles, there is another area of moral activity that 
underscores the foundational import of narrative identity: discussions about virtue and 
character (Ibid.). MacIntyre (2007) has led the way in claiming that the very notion of 
virtue is unintelligible without a narrative conception of what it means to live one’s life. 
To be virtuous is, for MacIntyre, to attempt to become a particular sort of person – to live 
one’s life in a particular way as it unfolds over time. This means not only that individuals 
who remain true to their narrative identity behave in certain ways, but also that they do 
so for certain reasons and with certain motives, and that they learn certain things from 
their past behavior and apply them to future behavior in certain ways. None of this 
makes sense in absence of a narrative conception of the self. Even Arras (1997), who is 
skeptical of MacIntyre’s claims (about whether truth can be identified through narrative), 
agrees that the only way to adequately depict, understand, and assess character is by 
telling and retelling stories (Brody 2003).
6.3. Rigor in Narrative Judgments and Ethical Justification
A general point of agreement among narrativists is that in order to critique a story, 
one needs a different story, or counter-story, with which to compare it (Brody 2003). 
As Margaret Urban Walker (1998) explains, the task of fully normative reflection is 
intrinsically comparative. In other words, when individuals ask themselves what can be 
said for some way of life, they are asking whether it is better or worse than some other 
way they know or imagine. Part of the attractiveness of narrative identity is its intuitive 
appeal: individuals can judge the coherence of an event within the context of a story. 
Walker, who views ethics primarily as an exercise in accountability and responsibility, 
places great stress on the significance of moral reliability. For her, moral responsibility 
lies at the intersection of the respective narratives of relationships, identity, and values, 
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and forms the basis for one’s identity. On this view, acts are wrong only by a judgment 
of radical incoherence from the standpoint of the narrator (Walker 1998). This indicates 
the possibility of employing narrative coherence or incoherence as a guide to moral 
justification for actions (Brody 2003).
Wide reflective equilibrium, as articulated by Norman Daniels (1979), locates 
justificatory power in coherence among three elements: particular moral judgments, 
general ethical principles, and background theories of human nature. One may sometimes 
alter a long-standing general principle because it fails to resonate with a particular case 
judgment. At other times one may dismiss a case judgment because it fails to cohere to 
an attractive general principle or theory. Circumstances determine how the equilibrium 
works for the best overall “fit” among the elements. Of course, any such fit is temporary, 
since a new case or background theory may upset the original reasoning (Brody 2003). 
Nevertheless, Daniels’ theory has respectable roots in moral and political philosophy, and 
it is tempting to adopt for justification in an ethics of narrative identity. One would 
simply designate the particular case judgments as “narratives.” Within this model, one 
need not reject normative principles, and one can acknowledge that at least some 
narrative judgments may be persuasive enough to overturn principle-based judgments 
on occasion. One could then use principles when they are helpful and remain focused on 
particular narratives as sources of moral justification (Ibid.). However, to maintain rigor, a 
“narrative equilibrium” must be more complex still.
On a fundamental level, narrative equilibrium is also coherentist. That is, what 
is ethically justified is what most accurately hangs together with everything else, 
acknowledging that one can seldom, if ever, provide an algorithm for deciding of 
what “hanging together” consists (Ibid.). As suggested above, narratives do not stand 
alone; they depend for their meaning on broader background narratives that are often 
taken for granted by those who share a common society and culture. At least some of 
the time, then, moral judgments and moral behavior are partially judged on grounds 
of coherence within and among one’s narratives. On other occasions, when wider 
reflection is needed, it may be necessary to appeal to background theories of human 
nature (encompassing psychological, sociological, or anthropological aspects) or to 
general principles. These elements are viewed as contained within a multilevel cluster 
of narratives. That is, background theories of human nature, even if apparently derived 
from the social sciences and quantified in statistical terms, are a sort of sociocultural 
background narrative, providing the story of how people in a society tend to behave and 
why. Narrative equilibrium is a product of human activity, and those humans function 
within a particular sociocultural context during a particular historical movement (Ibid.). 
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Thus, discerning that something is the case – whether this action is cruel or that ball is 
red – obviously involves subsuming the case under a concept, but it does not involve 
reaching a belief by invoking some generalization linking premises to conclusion (Little, 
2000). The question is not, therefore, how “subjective” stories can provide rigorous 
criticism, judgment, and justification in the context of ethical decision making, but how 
rigorous criticism, judgment, and justification can exist without the stories that frame 
one’s narrative identity (Brody 2003).
7. Conclusion
This essay examined the respective relationships shared between autobiographical 
memory, emotional rationality, and narrative identity in support of the argument that 
narrative identity, as the product of autobiographical memory and emotional rationality, 
is indispensable to substantive ethical decision making. To secure the justification of 
these theses, it demonstrated that (i) the disintegration of autobiographical memory 
degenerates emotional rationality; (ii) the degeneration of emotional rationality 
decays narrative identity; and (iii) the decay of narrative identity disables one to seek, 
identify, and act on the good. The essay concluded by suggesting that narrative identity, 
inextricably rooted in autobiographical memory and emotional rationality, may be 
successfully employed as a justificatory framework for ethical decision making, providing 
both education to, and rigor for, substantive moral judgments. 
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